

Safe Notice: 2026-014

Title:	Southwest Network RIM Transfer SMA to MTS (Asset Handover)		
Applicable Date:	From:	13/07/2026	To: Until withdrawn
Approved by:	Vishal Singh, A/Head of SQRE		
Issued by:	Vishal Singh, A/Head of SQRE		
Location:	Network Wide		
Distribution:	All Workers including stakeholders		
Version	01		

Purpose

This SAFE Notice is a notification of the planned transfer of the Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM) from the Sydney Metro Authority (SMA) to Metro Train Sydney (MTS) for the Southwest (SW) Network. Additionally, it permits the continuation of Dynamic Train Testing and Through Running activities during the RIM transfer process.

Introduction

Effective from **1800hrs on Monday 13 July 2026**, MTS becomes the RIM for the SW Network. The SW Network extends from Marrickville to Bankstown and incorporates associated operational and maintenance assets accepted as part of the approved handover package

Following the transfer, MTS will assume the duties of RIM including:

- MTS Rules, Procedures, Safe Notices and Safety Management System requirements apply.
- Access to the network shall be managed through MTS processes and approvals.
- Incident reporting, infrastructure management and operational control responsibilities transfer to MTS.
- All Workers must comply with all temporary controls, operational restrictions and interface requirements that remain in place following handover.

Unless specifically identified in a transitional arrangement, previous SMA and S2B operational arrangements no longer apply.

SMA has issued a Work Activity Advice (ref: SMCSWSSJ-JHL-WSS-PC-REC-000350) to fulfil Sydney Metro Local Possession Authority (SMLPA). SW Network is defined as Sydney Metro Southwest between Sydenham and Bankstown including all associated service facilities.

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Upon the RIM transfer, Sydney Metro Southwest Up and Down tracks between 5+440km (approx.) Sydenham to 18+632km Bankstown will be referred to as the MTS Network.

Note: Sydney Trains manage the Bankstown Plaza. MTS boundary ceases 1m beyond the Metro roller shutters.

Requirements and Exceptions

From the effective handover time:

- Train operations shall be controlled by MTS from the Operations Control Centre (OCC) and when required from the Back Up Operations Control Centre (BOCC).
- The OCC Manager Network Control is the primary operational interface for rail operations, incident management and infrastructure coordination.
- All operational activities shall be conducted in accordance with MTS Network Rules and Procedures including relevant systems and procedures
- Relevant Operations Control Instructions issued to support Asset Handover including Dynamic Train Testing and Through Running must be followed

Through Running and Dynamic Train Testing

To support operational readiness activities, MTS authorises the continuation of approved Dynamic Train Testing (DTT) and Through Running activities following Asset Handover.

Following transfer:

- MTS becomes the RIM for the full operating corridor.
- Through Running activities shall be conducted under MTS operational processes.
- The previous Dual-RIM operating arrangements, Train Testing Zone (TTZ) and Local Possession Authority arrangements that were used for pre-handover testing activities will no longer apply unless separately authorised.
- Future configuration changes associated with Through Running and Trial Running activities will continue to be communicated through Safe Notices and operational planning processes

Interfaces and Communications

Following Asset Handover:

- Operational interactions between MTS and Sydney Trains shall be managed through the applicable Rail Safety Interface Agreement (RSIA) and Operational Interface Protocol (OIP).
- Operational interactions between MTS and ARTC shall be managed through the applicable RSIA and OIP arrangements
- All incidents shall be managed in accordance with MTS incident management requirements.

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- Where incidents affect an interfacing railway, notification and coordination shall occur in accordance with the relevant Interface Agreement and OCC protocols.
- The dual on-call arrangement for the Crisis Event Team will cease. From the effective handover time, MTS will assume sole responsibility for the management, coordination and escalation of Crisis Event Team activations, incident notifications and associated operational support requirements. All escalations must be initiated and managed in accordance with MTS incident management processes and Operations Control Centre protocols.

Electrical Safety – Southwest Interim Control (PSD/MGF Insulation Resistance and Rail-to-Earth Potential)

An identified electrical safety hazard remains within the Southwest corridor associated with PSD-earth and MGF-earth insulation resistance deficiencies and rail-to-earth touch potential.

Personnel may be exposed to electric shock where simultaneous contact occurs between a rail and an earthed or conductive object, including platforms, walkways, handrails, plant, tools, rollingstock interfaces or station infrastructure. This hazard may exist even where traction power has been isolated.

For Trial Running, Through Running and associated commissioning activities, interim controls associated with the PSD/MGF insulation resistance issue remain in force until permanent rectification is completed. This includes the requirement for participants and workers to wear sturdy enclosed footwear where specified by approved procedures, briefings and operational instructions.

Workers undertaking work within the Southwest rail corridor are reminded that rail-to-earth potential remains an inherent characteristic of the DC traction return system. All workers must continue to comply with applicable electrical safety requirements, including Safety Alert SA-26-005 LV Shocks within Rail Corridor, Metro Electrical Safety Awareness (MESA) requirements and local worksite controls.

Mechanised Gap Filler (MGF) and Gap Detection System

An identified fall to ballast from side of MGF safety hazard remains within the Southwest corridor associated with Gap Detection System GDS deficiencies. Personnel may be exposed to undetected falls where dark clothing is worn, and the fall is not detected by the deficient GDS.

For Trial Running, Through Running and associated commissioning activities, interim controls associated with the GDS deficiency issue remain in force until permanent rectification is completed. This includes the requirement for participants and workers to wear hi-vis vest with reflective strips where specified by approved procedures, briefings and operational instructions.

Corridor Intrusion Detection System (CIDS)

At Asset Handover the CIDS system will not be operational for the purpose of detecting intruders into the UTO zone. The following controls must be in place after AH:

- Each train entering the SW must have a CJCT with DDU removed and a Pilot
- Roving security guards monitoring rail corridor specifically checking the UTO fence and gates

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- Protection Officer situated at Platform 2 Sydenham Station 24/7 to safeguard from intrusion into MTS operational network

Key Contacts

All incidents must be reported to MTS Operations Control Centre. The key contacts are noted below for reference:

Type	Name	Contact Details
All Incidents in the MTS Southwest Corridor	Traffic Controller South West	(02) 8882 3007
Electrical related emergencies	Electrical Controller	(02) 9854 4510
Interface related incidents impacting MTS (i.e. ARTC and ST to contact)	MTS OCC Manager Network Control	(02) 9854 4888
Interface related incidents impacting Sydney Trains	Sydney Trains ROC	(02) 8218 1308
Interface related incidents impacting ARTC	ARTC Network Control Centre South (Sydney 1 Network Controller)	(02) 6924 9806
Weekend and Engineering Hours Possession Contact	Possession Protection Officer (PPO)	(02) 9854 4552

Approval

Function	Position	Name		Date
Approved by	A/Head of SQRE. MTS	Vishal Singh		08/07/2026

Amendment Record

Date	Rev	Amendment description	By
08/07/2026	01	Final Version	Vishal Singh

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